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Abstract
Shareholders began to play an active role in diminishing the growing agency costs due to recent 
financial crisis, poor corporate governance and excessive executive compensations. They act as 
individual and corporate forms in order to protect their investment and increase firm value. 
Nowadays, social activities of the past have changed to replace the general manager, overcome the 
duality problem, elect a board member other than the management candidates, vote for acquisition 
or sale decisions, and dividend distribution. The ownership structure in Turkey is generally composed 
of families or individuals who do not act aggressively as the hedge funds in USA. The sales of Turkish 
companies’ shares to foreign shareholders, introduction of international investment funds in the local 
market, and electronic general meeting system introduced a few years ago contribute to shareholder 
activism in Turkey. Shareholder struggles are witnessed only in the Turkish stock market which is 
quoted in the NYSE. In this study, the two publicly traded companies in the telecommunication 
sector, namely Türk Telekom and Turkcell, are examined in terms of their financial situation, the 
acceptance rate of the propositions of the management in the general meetings, and the behavior 
of their share prices. Shareholder activism is not seen in the Telekom, whereas there have been 
trials and regulation changes for Turkcell. In terms of accounting-based data, Türk Telekom has a 
lower operational profitability and current ratio as compared to Turkcell. It is concluded that the 
level of shareholder activism occurred in the general meetings does not affect the share prices. Both 
companies’ shares moved in high correlation during the last three years. The share prices did not show 
abnormal patterns during the days following the general meetings. The reasons might be the growth 
of the telecommunication industry being above the national growth rate and the positive evaluations 
of the shareholders’ decisions by the investors for the future of the firm.
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Hissedar aktivizmi:  
türkiye telekomünikasyon sektörü
Özet
Yaşanan finansal krizler, kötü kurumsal yönetişim ve aşırı üst yönetici ücretleri gibi nedenlerden 
dolayı artan temsil maliyetlerinin azaltılmasında son yıllarda hissedarlar aktif rol oynamaya 
başlamışlardır. Yatırımlarını korumak ve şirket değerini yükseltmek için hissedarlar bireysel ve 
kurumsal olarak etkinlikte bulunmaktadırlar. Geçmişte çevrenin korunması gibi sosyal amaçlı 
etkinlikler düzenlenirken günümüzde genel müdürün değiştirilmesi, yönetim başkanı ve genel 
müdürün farklı kişilerden oluşması, yönetim kuruluna kendi adaylarının üye seçilmesi, şirket alımı 
veya satımı, kâr dağıtımı gibi konularda faaliyetler yürütülmektedir. Türkiye’deki hissedar aktivizmi 
şirket sahipliğinin büyük ölçüde aile ve bireysel kişilerden oluşması, yatırım fonlarının ABD’deki 
gibi saldırgan davranmaması gerekçelerinden dolayı sınırlıdır. Büyük şirketlerin hisselerini yabancı 
ortaklara satması, uluslararası yatırım fonlarının risk iştahı, uygulamaya başlanan elektronik genel 
kurul sistemi ile hissedar aktivizmi yaşanmaya başlamıştır. Türkiye’nin ABD menkul kıymetler 
borsasına kote olan tek şirketi olan Turkcell’de hissedar etkinliğine tanık olunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, 
hisseleri halka açık olan Turkcell ile Telekom şirketlerinin finansal durumu, genel kurullarında 
yönetim tarafından sunulan önerilerin kabul oranı ve hisse senedi fiyatlarının davranışı incelenmiştir. 
Telekom şirketinde hissedar aktivizmi görülmezken Turkcell şirketinde mahkemeye varan bir çekişme 
yaşanmış ve hissedarların korunması amacıyla yönetmeliklerde değişikliğe kadar gidilmiştir. Temel 
veriler incelendiğinde, Türk Telekom şirketinin faaliyet kârlılığı ve cari oranı Turkcell şirketine 
göre düşüktür. Yapılan çalışmada, telekomünikasyon sektöründe halka açık bu iki şirketin genel 
kurullarında yaşanan farklı hissedar aktivizminin hisse senedi fiyatları üzerinde anlamlı bir 
değişikliğe neden olmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Her iki hisse senedi birbiri ile yüksek korelasyon 
içinde hareket etmektedir. Genel kurulları izleyen günlerde de piyasa fiyatlarında bir farklılaşma 
yaşanmamaktadır. Bu durumun nedenleri arasında, sektördeki büyümenin ulusal ekonominin 
üzerinde olması ve hissedarlar tarafından alınan kararların şirketin geleceğine olumlu etki edeceğine 
yönelik yatırımcıların beklentileri sayılabilir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hissedar Aktivizmi, Temsil Kuramı, Telekomünikasyon, Türkiye
JEL Sınıflaması: G34, M12, M14
1. Introduction
Besides the technological changes, global uncertainties, increasing competition, low growth 
rates, which put pressure on the top management to achieve the firm goals, shareholders 
became dynamic actors to influence the board of directors. One naive rationale is the economic 
crises, which cause the bankruptcy of the firms, where shareholders lose their investments. 
Shareholders wish to track the operations of the firm and to intervene in the affairs of 
management whenever shareholders feel insecure about their capital. Another motivation is 
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the short-term profit orientation of corporate shareholders whose long-term strategies may 
differ from the ones of the invested company.
Capital board regulators introduce mechanism to allow shareholders to take active part in 
the general meetings. Once called as fat cats 1, executives face more challenges than ever to 
keep their positions under the critics and interventions of active shareholders. Global CEOs 
leaving their positions reached a high ratio of 17% in 2015. 41% of the shareholder proposals 
given in 2015 during the general meeting aimed to separate the company’s chairman and 
CEO positions 2. Publicly owned companies which were subject to shareholder activism have 
increased by 46% from 2013 to 2016 globally 3.While the USD 173 billion assets are managed 
by funds with a primary focus on activist investing, USD 250 billion stocks are held by activists 
worldwide at the beginning of the year 2016 4.
The agency problem in finance literature is often seen as a problem caused by the management 
of the company who can be in conflict with the interests of the shareholders. In recent decades, 
shareholders have gained power through the corporate investment opportunities. Shareholders 
may act by taking into consideration short-term concerns which may be against the company’s 
long-term strategies. These circumstances are often seen in the case of powerful shareholders, 
and investors who organize themselves in hedge funds. Driven by the short-term profit 
realization, shareholders vote against the recommendations of the board of directors.
Voting against the board of directors’ recommendations affects the value of the shares of the 
company. The uncertainties about the future of the company, disharmony between the board 
of directors and shareholders, threats of the current and potential investors give chaotic signals 
to markets.
This paper is organized as follows: The second part explores the term of shareholder activism 
in the literature. The third part analyzes the activism in telecommunication sector in Turkey. 
There are two companies, namely Telekom and Turkcell, whose shares are publicly traded. 
These two companies are classified in the top fifteen biggest companies in Turkey. The forth 
part summarizes the findings of the research. The fifth and last part concludes and gives 
recommendations about future studies. This article contributes to the literature in many 
ways. First, it describes the shareholder activism in Turkey where there are few academic 
studies. Secondly, it investigates two companies operating in the same sector with completely 
contradictory activism movements. Finally, the relationship between the general meeting 
activism and firm values are compared.
1 Ergin, Emre, “Does Excessive Executive Compensation Really Pay Shareholders?”, academy of accounting and 
Financial Studies Journal, 17 (1), 2013, ss. 47-51.
2 Copland, James R., The Push for Proxy Access Continues, Proxy Monitor Report, Manhattan Institute, 2016.
3 Black, Josh, The Activist Investing Annual Review 2017, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and 
Financial Regulation, Feb. 21, 2017.
4 Black, Josh, Activist Investing, 2016.
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2. Shareholder Activism Literature
The term activism originates in the beginning of the 1900s to denote people who act vigorously 
in political issues. The degree of activism depends on how much people feel threatened. People 
who show activism are called activists. Activists usually take part in mass demonstrations, 
manifestations, strikes, boycotts and protests. The term has evolved to include other fields other 
than politics. Environmental activists act in a manner to protect the natural environment. Human 
right activists try to protect and enrich the fundamental rights and freedoms. Consumer activists 
act by their economic purchasing power to change the company operations for the goods or 
services produced. Media activism usually uses social media (facebook, twitter, instagram) to 
give news not broadcasted by traditional media (national television channel). Internet activism 
helps activists communicate with encrypted mails and chat rooms by hiding their identities. 
Youth activism refers to young people who protest against war, crime, education, unemployment, 
tax and other issues. Activist movements are spread in many different fields including political, 
social and economic issues to improve the world.
Shareholders reactions against the firm managements have taken different concepts in the 
literature other than activism such as engagement, advocacy and pressure   5. Shareholder 
activism differs from the investor activism in the sense that the latter one tries to own a high 
percentage of firm’s shares in order to control the board of directors to realize crucial changes in 
the management.
Shareholder activism is first started as an act either to promote social changes such as environmental 
and work conditions, or to influence management to act in the will of shareholders. Besides these 
social proposals, shareholders have also proposals related to corporate governance. Corporate 
governance issues may include the appointment of the audit company, release of restricted 
stocks and executive compensation. Shareholders try to make changes in the context of social 
responsibility or firm performance. Chung and Talaulicar  6 state that shareholder actions are 
motivated either by social ends or by financial ends.
Although shareholders have the power to change the board of directors, it is not always possible 
to do that due to high or low ratio of publicly held companies and powerful board of directors. 
Thus, shareholders’ power is limited to electing and removing management. Shareholders have to 
vote for capital issues such as capital increase and dividend payments, mergers and acquisitions 
which are indeed an outcome of the operations of the management.
Since the Great Depression, laws and regulations have been towards the protection of shareholders. 
The problem of the agency, that is the management, is tried to be reduced by implementing 
5 Sjöström, Emma, “Shareholder Activism for Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do We Know?”, Sustainable 
development, 16 (3), 2008, s. 142.
6 Chung, Huimin and Talaulicar, Till, “Forms and effects of shareholder activism”, corporate Governance: an 
international review, 18 (4), 2010, s. 253.
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mechanism allowing shareholders to monitor the management. U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) introduced Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to submit proposals to the 
annual general meeting. Black   7investigated the activism in the firm’s financial performance 
and defined the term as the proactive efforts to change firm behavior in economic goals. He 
concluded that activists’ efforts are low and even when their proposals are accepted in the general 
meeting, the management is reluctant to implement them. Low  8 defines shareholder activism 
as the minority shareholders who use their rights to increase shareholder value over the long 
term. However, activism is neither unique to minorities nor is practiced for long run purposes. 
Sjöström  9 defines the concept as shareholders who use their position to influence firm policy 
and practice. Armour and Cheffins 10 distinguish between defensive and offensive activism. The 
former one is a reaction of corporate shareholders, such as mutual funds and pension funds, 
in order to make changes in the company when they are not satisfied with the consequences. 
Offensive activism is a proactive behavior by hedge funds which try to make changes in the 
company before the outcomes are obtained. Shareholder activism which demonstrates itself by 
hedge funds in the US affected corporate governance after the 2000s. Brav et al.  11 show the activist 
hedge funds generally success to influence corporate governance through CEO and to increase 
dividend payments. Not only the activities of current shareholders, but also the potential threat 
of future activists has a corrective effect on management behavior 12. Activists can contribute 
to the firm value by their creative ideas which are later discussed by the management which 
usually prefers to deal with ideas concerning long-term strategies. Cohn et al.  13 give evidence 
that increased shareholder control helps contribute to the firm value maximization in favor of 
shareholders for the large and medium sized firms. However, the success rate of shareholders’ 
demands is approximately 65% for the US and the UK, and almost 50% for the Asia region  14. 
The statistics shows that management paysmore attention to shareholders’ demands than it 
used to be. This allows shareholders to decrease agency costs. To give a few examples, when 
unsatisfactory shareholders of Walt Disney forced management to restructure the company, the 
CEO and general manager Eisner lost some of his authorities. Apple faced a court case from 
a corporate shareholder, Greenlight Capital Inc., to distribute more dividends. Another hedge 
fund, Third Point LLC, put pressure on Yahoo to have a word in the management of the company. 
7 Black, Bernard S., 1998. Shareholder activism and corporate governance in the United States. In: Newman, Peter 
(Ed.), The new Palgrave dictionary of economics and the law, 3, 1998, s. 460.
8 Low Chee K., “A Road Map for Corporate Governance in East Asia”, northwestern Journal of international 
Business law, 25, 2004, s. 186.
9 Ibid, 142.
10 Armour, John and Cheffins Brian (2012). “The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds”, Journal 
of alternative investments, 14 (3), 2012, s. 19.
11 Brav, Alon and Jiang, Wei and Kim, Hyunseob, “Hedge Fund Activism: A Review”, Foundations and trends in 
Finance, 4 (3), 2009, s. 230.
12 Fos, Vyecheslav, The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests, Workingpaper, Columbia University, 2011.
13 Cohn, Jonathan B. and Gillan, Stuart L. And Hartzell, Jay C., “On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd-) Frank 
Assessment of Proxy Access, The Journal of Finance, 71 (4), 2016, s. 1663.
14 Activist Insight, Activist Investing Review, 2016, s. 9-10.
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Other well-known companies like Microsoft, eBay and PepsiCo faced active investors. Statistics 
shows that shareholder proposals are increasing: Proposals in 2016 increased by 7,5% compared 
to those in 2015 and by 48% compared to those in 2014 in the USA. One third of the proposals 
come from retirement funds, another one third from powerful individual shareholders, and 22% 
from the context of social responsibilities. Approximately 43% of proposals are for corporate 
governance, 42% are for social policy, and 15% are for executive compensation 15.
Activists try to replace board members, make a part or the whole of the firm sell, go into mergers 
and acquisitions. Activists movements contribute to the firm value by involving management in 
taking more initiatives, asking management to consider other opportunities, using idle sources 
more effectively (either by distributing them as dividends or by investing), and giving a signal to 
top management team to behave in the benefit of the shareholders. On the other hand, the main 
criticism against the activist shareholders is that they are short-term oriented which may disturb 
the long-term strategic plans of the firm. The mismanagement of the communication between 
management and shareholders leads shareholders to act in such a way that management gives 
their energy on this debate instead of concentrating on main business activities. The outcome 
is the worsening of the financial statements and market price which makes shareholders to take 
even more severe measures.
Continental European and Anglo-Saxon models exist in the context of corporate governance. The 
models distinguish from one to another in terms of culture, jurisdiction and market behaviors. 
Ownership concentration is high in the European model so that the focus is on the stakeholders 
such as employees, suppliers and banks. Families own companies in Germany, France and Japan 
so the minority rights are reinforced by laws such as executive compensation voting. The latter 
one which is represented by the USA, England, Canada and Australia focuses on shareholders 
where the ownership is dispersed through the stock market. The major investors are mutual 
funds which may behave in profit maximization concerns in the short-term. When the investors 
believe the company is not properly managed, they can turn to activist shareholders to change 
the management, make mergers or acquisitions, affect the dividend distribution, and make 
borrowings. The top management is afraid of these kinds of activist shareholders. On the other 
hand, the executive compensation which is usually linked to company profits and shares, forces 
top managers to achieve success in the short-run in risky plans neglecting long-term sustainable 
investments. This dilemma pushes shareholders to act as traders. These are the reasons why the 
activist movements are high in the Anglo-Saxon culture. A recent survey showed that there were 
223 activists cases in the USA, while there were only 35 cases in Europe. The half of the target was 
board membership, and the rest were merger, acquisition, financial statements, management, and 
executive compensation. Ganchev  16 found a 29% of success rate of activism over 504 campaigns 
15 Copland, Ibid.
16 Gantchev, Nickolay, “The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model”, Journal of 
Financial economics, 107 (3), 2013, s. 625.
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analyzed. Most of the campaigns were organized to prevent the sale of the company to a third 
party. The other campaign subjects were dividends, repurchase and excess cash.
Activism can be analyzed in term of its costs. Proposals, negative votes and vote-no campaigns 
are low cost activist behaviors. These low cost strategies are important as it is difficult to own 
large shares even for the hedge funds which try to diversify their investments. Ertimur et al.  17 
provide evidence on a 38% decrease of CEO total pay caused by low cost activism. Shareholder 
activism may also be costly due to aggressive negotiations with management and organized 
campaigns. Independent financial consulting firms emerged in order to provide services to 
activist shareholders during their campaigns to overcome management actions that might not be 
the optimum strategy for shareholders. The service continues after the activists earn a member 
seat in the board. Thus, in situations where the costs of activism are high, the benefits taken 
by the shareholders might be limited. However, increasing and recent literature on shareholder 
activism promises a surplus for shareholders.
3. Shareholder Activism In Turkey: Telecomunication Case
Turkish corporate governance environment is similar to the European model as a result of the 
presence of companies owned largely by individuals or families, the low percentage of free float 
rate of publicly traded companies, and the integration process with the EU. 95% of companies in 
Turkey are classified as small and medium sized enterprises, and owned by families. The disclosure 
of the executive compensation was discussed but omitted when the new Turkish Commercial 
Code came into effect in 2011. Shareholders now have the right to reveal their thoughts, ask 
questions, comment on financial statements, discuss the performance of the company, question 
board member candidates during the presentation of the résumé, and proxy voting.
Investment funds do not show activist movements in Turkey. The stock market and the 
instruments are quite new compared to those in the USA and Europe. Growing market and 
traditional investment strategies restrain activist behavior. However, Turkcell case is an important 
example of shareholders who pursue different strategies to take control over the company.
It is difficult for the activist shareholders to reach their goals when an important percentage 
of the Turkish companies is controlled by a family. However, the need to raise capital through 
stock market, legislations to strengthen minority rights, foreign investors owning two third of 
the Turkish stocks, growing corporate funds stimulated by the government, and the desire of 
the investors for more profits in the shortest period will help the activist shareholder mentality 
flourish in Turkey.
17 Ertimur, Yonca and Ferri, Fabrizio and Muslu, Volkan, “Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay”, The review of 
Financial Studies, 24 (2), 2011, s. 537.
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3.1. Shareholder Activism In The General Board
Shareholders activism can take several forms: refusing or abstaining from voting during the 
general board meeting; putting an annotation to the minutes of the board at the end of the 
meeting. In the extreme cases, shareholders also have the right to sue the decisions taken during 
the meeting.
In the general meetings, shareholders can refuse or abstain from the following decisions: electing 
the chairmanship committee, authorizing the chairmanship committee to sign the minutes, 
approving the balance sheet and profit/loss accounts for the year, releasing the board of directors, 
defining the salaries of the members of the board of directors, electing members of the board 
of auditors and defining their terms of office and their salaries, resolving on the proposal of 
the board of directors regarding the distribution of the profit, electing the independent auditor, 
determining limit donations and aids to be made, approving dividend policy and dividend payout 
ratio.
Shareholders in Turkey can ask questions in the general meetings organized electronically. 
This kind of meeting allows efficiency and effectiveness in terms of participation costs, time 
and security. Shareholders may share their ideas, ask online questions and get answers from the 
management. A study showed shareholders had 455 propositions and 420 negative votes during 
2013 and 2014 electronic general meetings 18. The opportunities of direct communication give 
shareholders to know each other and increase the understandings. The activism concerns topics 
such as executive compensation, donations, dividend policy, and representation of women. This 
new meeting style enforces transparency and accountability as well.
Ferri  19documents that delays in voting practices (for instance, triennial as opposed to annual) 
reduces management responsiveness to shareholders, hence reducing management accountability. 
Prevost et al.  20 highlight the character of activist shareholders who try to communicate and 
cooperate with other influential shareholders so that the sharing of information decreases the 
uncertainties on stock prices that become more informative. Thus, frequent voting and electronic 
meetings where shareholders meet each other as well as management contribute positively to 
corporate governance.
18 Ergincan, Yakup and Karaağaçlı, Bora, “How Electronic General Meetings Affected Exercise of Shareholder Rights 
in Turkey: An Analysis of the Turkish Model in Light of International Market Standards and Regulations”, Boğaziçi 
Journal review of Social, economic and administrative Studies, 29 (1), 2015, s. 113.
19 Ferri, Fabrizio and Oesch, David, “Management Influence on Investors: Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the 
Frequency of Say on Pay”, contemporary accounting research, 33 (4), 2016, s. 1362.
20 Prevost, Andrew K. and Wongchoti, Udomsak and Marshall, Ben R., “Does institutional shareholder activism 
stimulate corporate information flow?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 70, 2016, s. 115.
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3.2. Telecommunication Industry
The demographic characteristics of the Turkish population which reveal itself in its large size, 
youth, urbanization, and interest in high technology services like the upcoming 5G promise 
growth and profitability in the telecommunication market. This is the main reason why foreign 
investors are interested in the Turkish market. All of the four big companies have foreign 
shareholders.
The major players in the Turkish telecommunication market are Türk Telekom Group, Turkcell, 
Vodafone and Avea. The first company mentioned above is the main fixed line operator. The 
three others are the main mobile operators. Shareholder structure of Türk Telekom and Turkcell 
are given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Shareholder Structure (Thousand TL)
Shareholders % nominal Shares
Ojer Telekomünikasyon A.Ş. 55,00 1.925.000
Turkish Treasury 30,00 1.050.000
Publicly traded shares 15,00 525.000
total türk telekom 100.00 3.500.000
Turkcell Holding A.Ş. 51,00 1.122.000
Publicly traded shares 48,95 1.077.004
Others 0,05 996
total turkcell 100,00 2.200.000
The origin of Türk Telekom can be traced back to the foundation of a state company in 1840. 
The initial name and services changed several times until the privatization in 2005 when 55% of 
the shares were sold to Ojer Telekomünikasyon A.Ş. (“OTAŞ”). Turkish treasury offered 15% of 
the shares to stock market. Türk Telekom dominates the market by its fixed line operators and 
infrastructure in the country. It also started fiber network technology investment.
Turkcell is the leader in terms of total revenues in the market. Turkcell is the only Turkish stock 
listed in another stock market, namely The New York Stock Exchange. Although four consecutive 
Turkcell general meetings after 2011 were held, they were cancelled due to disagreement. On 26 
March 2015 the general meeting for the periods from 2010 to 2014 was held. In fact, the conflicts 
among the three big shareholders of Turkcell -Turkish Çukurova Group, Baltic TeliaSonera and 
Russian Alfa- began ten years ago. Due to the economic problems of Çukurova Group who was 
also operating in the banking sector, shares were exchanged and also put in pledge between these 
companies which ended in lawsuits for the ownership of the shares during 2005 and 2010. The 
unresolved disputes pushed TeliaSonera and Alfa to block the general meetings during the years 
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2010 and 2014 in order to prevent Çukurova Holding from having loan opportunities and being 
forced to accept their proposals. The total distributable dividends reached TL 4 billion. In 2013, 
the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) published a bulletin affirming that they can appoint 
independent board members to companies whose general meeting is not held for two consecutive 
periods to protect minorities’ rights. This minute was perceived positively and the shares increased 
by 1% in the markets. In March 2013 the CMB appointed three independent members to the 
board. However, shareholders could not agree again and the previous board member election 
period was completed and the new ones could not be appointed. Thus, members from the CMB 
were left alone in the board. The Turkish Parliament passed a new law to permit the CMB to 
appoint more independent members to companies. Towards the end of 2014 and at the beginning 
of 2015 important managers, including the chief executive officer leading the company since 2007, 
left. At the 26 March 2015 general meeting, fiscal years from 2010 to 2014 were approved, the 
board members were released, profit distribution policy, and profit distribution were accepted; 
while the main agreement amendment was not accepted. However, main agreement amendment, 
share repurchase authority to board of directors and profit distribution were not accepted in the 
general meeting of 2015 held on 29.03.2016.
4. Research
4.1. Fundamental Analysis
The selected figures from the financial statements of both firms for the years 2016 and 2015 are 
shown in Table 4.1.
Türk Telekom has a weak current ratio (1,11), high long-term bank borrowings, and low 
shareholders’ equity due to the loss occurred and the distribution of profits in the previous years. 
The company’s 2016 loss comes majorly from the foreign currency expenses as result of the high 
devaluation of Turkish Lira. Turkcell has an adequate current ratio (1,81), a balanced asset and 
liabilities, and high shareholder’ equity because of undistributed dividends. As of 31.12.2016, the 
cumulative profit reached almost TL 13 billion. Sales growth exceeds 10% in both companies; 
operating profit (EBIT) has decreased as compared to the prior year, and is 13% and 24% for Türk 
Telekom and Turkcell respectively. Türk Telekom generates cash from operations higher than its 
competitor. Turkcell has a greater market share price which makes its market to book ratio lower, 
having a greater market capitalization.
Although Turkcell has approximately 10% less sales than the market leader, it has strong financial 
figures except the cash obtained from operations, which is not a drawback. Turkish treasury still 
owning 30% of Telekom gives an additional confidence to Türk Telekom investors apart from its 
growing and giant aspects.
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Table 4.1: Brief Financial Data (Million TL)
türk telekom turkcell
31.12.2016 31.12.2015 31.12.2016 31.12.2015
Current Assets 9.236 8.442 13.351 8.795
Fixed Assets 17.639 17.332 18.249 17.389
total assets 26.874 25.774 31.600 26.184
Short Term Liab. 8.352 8.553 7.359 6.304
Long Term Liab. 15.136 12.228 8.173 5.481
Shareholders’ Equity 3.387 4.993 16.068 14.399
Sales 16.109 14.523 14.101 12.769
Gross Profit 7.130 6.957 5.067 5.003
EBIT 2.140 3.039 3.451 3.341
Financial Exp. Net -2.593 -1.904 -1.383 -1.135
Profit Before Tax -397 1.261 1.563 2.206
EPS (TL) -0,207 0,259 0,689 0,941
CF from Operations 4.932 4.498 1.218 2.663
CF from Investing -4.612 -3.166 -3.588 -4.324
CF from Financing -402 -1.156 4.839 -4.887
Market to Book Ratio 5,46 3,68 1,33 1,51
Price/(EBIT/Capital) 8,65 6,29 6,20 6,52
Capital 3.500 3.500 2.200 2.200
Market Share Price 5,29 5,46 9,73 9,90
Market Capitalization 18.515 19.110 21.406 21.780
note: Sums may not be correct due to rounding. EPS stands for earnings per share. CF stands for cash flow.
4.2. Shareholder Activism in General Meetings
Shareholders of Turkcell try to control the management so that the general meetings could not 
be performed for four consecutive years in the past. Therefore, in 2015, the general meeting 
was conducted concerning five years (from 2010 to 2014). Although each year’s agenda was 
discussed and voted separately, the votes were in the same pattern for each year. Table 4.2 reports 
the acceptance percentage of the selected agenda topics of the 2016 and 2015 general meeting 
voting of Türk Telekom and Turkcell for the fiscal years of 2015 and 2014. As it can be noticed, 
there is almost a perfect harmony in the decisions taken by the shareholders of Türk Telekom, 
and none of the proposals were rejected. On the other hand, in the general meeting of Turkcell, 
not even one decision was unanimous, and some rejected. There were even some contradictory 
decisions taken in Turkcell; for instance, dividend policy was accepted but dividend distribution 
was rejected. According to Table 4.2, in 2015 one management proposal and in 2016 three were 
rejected. The agenda concerning donation limit in 2016 was accepted by a low percentage of 64%.
Emre ERGİN • İlkay Ejder ERTURAN
112
Table 4.2: Percentage (%) of Acceptance in the General Meeting
türk telekom turkcell
agenda\dates* 16.05.2016 31.03.2015 29.03.2016 26.05.2015
Election of chairman 100 100 99,999 99,933
The reading of the summary of the 
annual report
98,014 97,427 94,878 N/A
Approval of the financial statements 99,998 100 99,954 99,889
Release of the board members 99,997 99,998 99,822 98,348
Donation policy N/A N/A 99,886 98,364
Following year’s donation upper limit 
determination
N/A N/A 64,106 98,364
Main agreement change N/A N/A 27,134 (r) 23,967 (r)
Auditor selection 99,529 99,597 99,221 98,494
Share repurchase authorization N/A N/A 27,331 (r) N/A
Dividend distribution 100 100 42,028 (r) 99,242
note: This table presents the acceptance percentage of the selected topics during the general meetings. 
The agenda does not include all the topics discussed in the meeting. (r) stands for the proposal which 
is rejected. (*) shows dates of the general meeting; for instance, 2016 is the general meeting for the 2015 
fiscal year. N/A stands for not applicable meaning that either the topic was not included in the agenda or 
there was no voting.
In the following part, the effects of these rejections are analyzed.
4.3. Share Price Behavior
The descriptive statistics are presented in the Table 4.3 for the period from 01.01.2014 to 
31.12.2016.
Graphic 4.1 shows the share price movements over a three-year period (01.01.2014-31.12.2016) 
where Turkcell is set to the same starting point of Türk Telekom to analyze the correlation between 
them. Both shares move in very similar ways to each other and at the end of the three-year period 
they are very close. There is an upper movement which starts at the beginning of the years (before 
general meetings) for 2014, 2015 and 2016, and followed by a decrease towards the summer (after 
the general meetings) for the 2015 and 2016 years. Even though Türk Telekom paid dividends and 
Turkcell did not in 2016, the trends of both shares were quite similar. Shareholder activism in the 
general meetings has no effect in the long-run of share prices.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
türk telekom turkcell BiSt 100
Mean 5,83 10,98 77.681,57
Standard Error 0,02 0,03 208,81
Median 5,80 10,98 78.019,48
Standard Deviation 0,54 0,94 5.737,53
Kurtosis -0,96 -0,87 0,51
Skewness 0,08 0,05 -0,59
Range 2,37 4,65 30.223,79
Maximum 7,04 13,54 91.412,94
Minimum 4,68 8,89 61.189,15
Confidence Level (95%) 0,04 0,07 409,92
N: 755. BIST 100 index is a capitalization-weighted index composed of 100 national market companies.
Graphic 4.1: Türk Telekom and Turkcell Share Prices
Source: www.finans.mynet.com. Türk Telekom (yellow line) and Turkcell (red line) share price movements 
for the period of 01.01.2014 and 31.12.2016. The shares are set to the same starting point in the graphic to 
notice the correlation.
Another investigation made is whether the share prices reacted to the general meetings decisions 
to see the short-term effect. The share prices are obtained for the ten days following the general 
meeting. The share price changes and the correlations are analyzed up to ten days in a cumulative 
way to observe whether the data from the general meetings are fully obtained by the market. 
From the percentage changes in share prices, the percentage change in the whole market index 
(XU 100 or BIST 100) is eliminated to obtain the real changes of the observed shares. There has 
been found not significant correlation. It is concluded that the share prices are not affected by the 
shareholder activism in the short or long term. Table 4.4 presents the correlation matrix.
Table 4.4: Correlation Between Variables
Variables Turkcell BIST-100
Türk Telekom 0,784* 0,823*
Turkcell 0,767*
Notes. n = 755. *: significant at the p < .001.
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There is a significant very strong positive relationship among all the variables. Further analysis 
is conducted by using event study methodology. Event dates are the four general meetings dates 
shown in Table 4.2. Expected returns, abnormal returns (AR), cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR), and t-statistics are calculated for the hundred days before the event dates and 10 days 
following the event dates. The t-statistics being greater than 1.96 for the 10 days after the event 
dates are considered as significant. However the single-factor model does not give assurance 
whether the ARs and CARs are the solely result of the general meetings. Therefore a two-factor 
model is constructed by using BIST 100 to investigate if the stocks ARs are the results of the 
general meetings or the behavior of the stocks are in line with the market behavior. It is found 
that a few days have significant t-statistics, meaning that the investors take into consideration the 
results of the general meetings, but these days are followed immediately by opposite returns to 
off-set the significant ARs and CARs. It is concluded that shareholder activism has not significant 
effect on the share prices.
5. Conclusion
The firms face shareholder activism for many reasons. The general stimulus of shareholders is 
the poor financial performance of large firms which is indicated by either low sales, earnings, 
dividend payment policies or market values. Another stimulus is usually driven by corporate 
shareholders, namely hedge funds which target small firms by aiming various strategies usually 
focusing on short-term returns. The general outcome of shareholder activism has a positive 
influence on firm value and corporate governance as compared to years before the 2000s 21. The 
shareholder structure, cultural mind-set and company size are important criteria for activism.
Shareholder activism is especially witnessed in the Anglo-Saxon countries followed by the 
European countries. However, there is a sharp increase in other part of the world such as Japan. 
Turkey, being similar to European corporate structure in terms of ownership structure, has a low 
percentage of shareholder activism. This trend changes with the international funds investing 
in the country and increasing shareholder rights such as the electronic general meeting system 
introduced lately. This paper examined Turkish telecommunication sector where the two big 
companies’ shares are traded publicly. One company does not witness any shareholder activism, 
whereas the other strongly faces activism. However, the shareholder activism does not seem to 
affect share prices in the period just after the general meetings, or also in the long-term period. 
Reasons might be the double digit growth potential of the sector and investors’ trust in these two 
big companies.
Research shows shareholder activism contributes to the firm value by decreasing agency costs. New 
mechanism should be adapted to increase shareholder communication. One alternative may be 
the proposals given by shareholders in the USA. In Turkey, proposals are made during the general 
21 Denes, Matthew R. and Karpoff, Jonathan M. and McWilliams, Victoria B., “Thirty years of shareholder activism: A 
survey of empirical research”, Journal of corporate Finance, in press, 2017.
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meetings. However, shareholders may submit their proposals before the general meeting. The 
proposal, the answer and recommendation of the management might be published in the annual 
report before the general meeting to allow parties to examine the proposals. This shareholder 
right can be implemented in Turkey in the future to allow shareholders to communicate their 
ideas and to get support before the meetings. Further research can be carried out to examine the 
shareholder activism in other sectors, and its relationship to market value.
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